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Summary findings
Except during the Great Depression, the historical path  stagnation (plains) or even steady decline (valleys).
for per capita GDP in the United States has been  Second, volatility - however measured - is much
reasonably stable exponential trend growth, with modest  greater in developing than in industrial countries.
cyclical deviation. Graphically, growth in the United  These stylized observations about growth rates,
States displays as a modestly sloping, only slightly  Pritchett concludes, suggest that it may be useless to use
bumpy, hill.  But almost nothing that is true about per  "panel data" to investigate long-term growth rates in
capita GDP for the United States (or for other OECD  developing countries. Perhaps more can be learned about
countries) is true for developing countries.  developing countries by investigating what initiates (or
First, per capita GDP in most developing countries  halts) episodes of growth.
does rLot  follow a single time trend: For a given country,  There is something of a professional split in "growth"
there  is great instability in growth rates over time,  literature, Pritchett observes. Macroeconomists studying
relative to both average level of growth  and to cross-  inidustrial  countries discuss steady-state growth and
sectional variance.  ponder whether  all countries in the "convergence club"
These shifts in growth rates lead to distinct patterns.  will reach tlhe same happy level in the end.  Development
Some countries have had steady growth  (hills and steep  economists, on the other hand, are the pathologists of
hills); others have had rapid growth followed by  economics, having discovered that developing countries
stagnation (plateaus); others have had rapid growth  are most emphatically not all alike.  Developing
followed by declines (mountains) or even catastrophic  countries have found ways to be ecstatic but they have
declines (cliffs); still others have experienced continuous  also discovered many different ways to be unhappy.
This  paper-a  product of the Development  Research  Group-is  part of a larger effort in the group to understand  the determinants
of economic growth. Copies  of the paper are available  free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433.
Please  contact  Sheila  Fallon,  room MC3-638,  telephone  202-473-8009,  fax  202-522-1153,  Internet address  sfallon@worldbank.org.
The author may be contacted at lpritchett@worldbank.org.  July 1998. (40 pages)
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Hills,  Plateaus,  Mountains,  and Plains
"Happy  families are all alike, every unhappy  family is unhappy  in its own way"
Leo Tolstoy
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Introduction
The aspect  of economic  growth that makes it "hard to think about anything  else" (Lucas,
1988) are large and persistent differences  in growth rates across countries'. The power of
compound  interest turns even smallish growth differences  sustained  over long periods into
huge shifts in living standards,  and largish  growth differences  into seismic shifts. According
to Maddison's  data from 1870  to 1980 the USA grew at 1.84 percent per annum, Great Britain
grew at 1.24 percent per annum, and Japan grew at 2.64.  The cumulative  effect of a .6 of  a
percentage  point lag in growth versus the USA saw Great Britain go from the economic
superpower  to playing catch up.  The cumulative  effect  of Japan's .8 percentage  point growth
edge over the USA transformed  Japan from backwater  to economic  superpower. With its 1.4
percent edge in growth, Japan went from having only fifth of Great Britain's per capita income
to equality. The recent huge growth spurts of some East Asian countries, sustained  over
several decades,  have changed  have the global  economic  map.
However, this fixation  on differences  in long-run (even  possibly steady state) differences  in
growth in the theoretical  and empirical  research explaining  growth has led to an
underestimation  of the importance  of the instability  and volatility in growth rates, especially  in
the developing  countries. Is explaining  Brazil's "growth" explaining  the 4.2 percent (all
I Of course,  if one divides  macro  phenomena  into  "trend"  and "cycle"  and  is convinced  that  business  cycle
fluctuations  are voluntary  reallocations  of factors, including  labor supply,  across  periods, so that cycles  have little
or no welfare  consequences,  then obviously  the "trend" is all that is left for macro  economists  think about.growth  rates are per capita per annum)  growth from 1965  to 1980  or explaining  the stagnation
from 1980  to 1992 (actually  a slight fall of -.2 percent)  or explaining  Brazil's average growth
percent from 1960-92  of 3.14?
From 1960 to 1980 Cote d Ivoire grew at 3.1 percent, something  of an African growth
miracle, while from 1980 to 1992 GDPPC in Cote d Ivoire  fell at 4.1 percent, a growth
disaster. Its average  growth for the entire period was .22 percent. Nearby Senegal  grew very
steadily, but very very slowly, at the nearly identical  average  growth rate of .18 percent.
What is the relevant sense in which the "growth" experience  of Senegal  and C6te d'Ivoire
explained  by growth  theory or empirics was the same?
In addition  to instability  in growth rates in the developing  countries  there is enormous
volatility in output.  While in developed economies that ratio of the standard deviation of
natural log first differences  is about 1, so annual flucuations  are about equal in magnitude  to
trend growth, in a typical  developing  economy  this ratio is four times as high.  This
combination  of instability  and volatility  makes it difficult  to separate "long-run" growth from
exogenous  shocks,  business cycles, or transitional  growth due to changes  in levels.
This paper has two linked halves. The first part is entirely descriptive  and provides a set
of  non-standard  summary  statistics  characterizing  the evolution of GDP per capita for a broad
cross section  of countries, with particular emphasis  on going  beyond average  growth rates to
instability  in growth rates and the volatility  of output. The second half of the paper discusses
the implications  for recent econometric  research. The use of  "panel" data, particularly  with
"fixed effects" to investigate  long-run growth effects  is almost certainly  pointless.
2Suggestions  for future growth research into the determinants  of shifts in growth rates by
focusing  on episodes  concludes  the paper.
I) Data and Methods
The output variable  used throughout  is RGDPCH  (denoted  GDPPC or simply  y for its
natural log) the chain linked index of real GDP per capita measured in 1985  purchasing  power
parity dollars from the Penn World Tables Mark 5.62. I use data from 1960 (data prior to
1960 was dropped  to maintain  cross-national  comparability)  to the last available  date, using
only those with at least 25 years of data, which leaves 111  countries. The final year of the
data varies from 1985  to 1992, and so will be referred to as the "most recent."
Statistics  are calculated  for three aspects  of growth for each country: levels, instability,
and volatility.  The procedures for each of these are described  in table 1.  First are the basic
statistics  on the level of income and growth rate (unless  otherwise  noted all subsequent
references  to "growth" refer to lest squares growth rates) over the whole period and sub-
periods. Calculated  are: initial income,  final income, average annual  growth based on end
points, and the ratio of fmal income  to the maximum  and to the minimum  income.
The second set are statistics  on the instability  of growth, changes in growth rates within a
country. The single best year to break the trend into two parts is chosen  by minimizing  the
SSE from doing so, similar to an analysis of Ben David and Papell (1997). This procedure is
2  Although  almost  certainly  none of the results  about  growth and its characteristics  would  differ much if I had
used the World  Bank's national  accounts  data on real per capita GDP in local currency  constant  prices.  The
PWT5.6  provide  information  about  the level  of GDPPC  in comparable  terms,  but since  for  nearly  all developing
countries  there are few benchmark  points  nearly  all the time series  content is straight from the World Bank  data.
3used to calculate  the year of the break in trend and the growth rate before, the growth rate
after and the difference  between  the growth rates.
The third set are statistics  on the volatility  of output. Here the procedures  are based on
three different  aspects  of the time series; the deviations  from a single trend; the variability  of
first differences  and the magnitude  of second differences;  the forecast ability of the time series
based on a rolling trend calculated  with a fixed length of past data.
Due to the cross-national  distribution  of the data I will, in most of the summary
discussions,  use robust statistics:  the median as a measure of central tendency  and the rank
(not simple)  correlation as a measure of association. The summary  statistics  results are
calculated  separately  for the developing  (or equivalently  and noted honestly, LDC) and
developed  countries.
Membership  in the OECD (before  any recent expansion)  is the criteria for "developed"
while "developing"  are the rest.  Although  it is mostly  standard, my classification  does require
some  discussion  on two points.  The minor point is that I include  two Mediterranean  Islands,
Malta and Cyprus, in the "developed"  category even though they are not part of the OECD
and that I exclude  Turkey  even though it is. The major point is that this definition  of
"developed"  does not correspond  to an income ranking. It differs  from the World Bank's "High
Income"  category  by consistently  excluding  oil producers  (e.g. Kuwait,  Saudi  Arabia)  and by not
adding  new entrants  as they pass an income  threshold,  (e.g.,  Singapore  and Hong Kong). If
countries  are classified  by income in some "initial" period this would not produce  the same
classification  as "developed". For instance, in 1960 the data say Venezuela  had higher income
than France, Iraq than Japan, Mexico than Greece. I feelthe OECD  non-OECD  distinction
4captures the more general meaning  of "developed"  than do categories  based strictly on
income. This definition  of developed  does affect  the results. One of the notable features of
the data is the very strong performance  over this period by the initially "poorer" members  of
the OECD: Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Japan.
There are two companions  to this paper.  One is a set of graphs of y, for each country,
with all the growth statistics  embedded  into the graph.  The graphs have common  horizontal
and vertical scaling  (although  not intercepts)  so that variability  and growth rates can be
visually  compared across  countries (see representative  figures below) 3. A second is the
country  by country results for each statistic  computed,  available  on the World Bank's Growth
Research  Web site.
3 Although  a necessary  drawback  of choosing  a common  scaling  is that the high growth (mainly  East Asian)
countries  go off the top of their graphs.
5Table 1: Description  of the calculated  statistics  on growth rates
A) Basic  statistics  on level and average growth
Least squares  growth rate  the coefficient  b from a trend line regression, ln(y,)=a+  bt +e
Initial Income  GDPPC  for the first year (yo),  generally  1960.
Final  Income  GDPPC  for the final year (YT),  generally 1992.
Average Annual  Growth  (YT / yO  ) A  l/T  - 1 average of the annual growth rates.
Ratio of Final Income to  YT / max (y t) or  yT / min (y,)
Maximum  (Minimum)
B) Statistics  on Instability  in Growth
Growth  rates by period  This calculates  the least squares growth rates for the periods 1960-73,
1973-82,  and 1982  to the most recent.
Best Single  Breakpoint  in  if ln(y,) = a, + b, t + a,, + bl, t + E,  where period I is {  1,.. t} and
Trend  period II is {t+ 1, ... T} then t chosen to minimize the SSE
(constrained  so that t > 6 and T-t> 6).  Four statistics  are reported,
year of breakpoint (t);  growth before the break (b,);
growth after the break (b,, ); difference in growth rates (b,, - b,).
C)  Statistics  on Volatility  in growth
(In)  First differences  fd,  = ln(y,)  - ln(y,,), reported are the Coefficient of Variation, Mean,
and Standard Deviation.
In second differences  sd, = In (y) - In (Y.  reported is the median of the absolute value
Deviations  from trend  Where e  = a'  + b' ln(y,)  is the deviation  from trend reported are
the Standard Deviation of e  ,  and the R-squared of the trend
regression.
Forecast Errors  fe,  (10,3)  = ln(y,)  - ln(y,)', the actual  less the three year ago
predicted value where the prediction is  ln(y,)' = ln(y,3)  + b'  * 3
where b' is estimated  on data from t-3, t-3-10. Reported  are the
absolute  value of the Mean and the Maximum.
611) Results
A) Basic Growth  Statistics
Growth rates were substantially faster in the developed countries than LDCs.  The median
growth rate over the entire period for the developed countries was 2.86, almost twice the 1.51
rate for the developing countries.  As many others have emphasized, incomes show absolute
divergence, with a widening of the cross-national distribution of income (Quah, 1997).  The
ratio of median incomes of the two groups increased from 5 to 1 to over 7 to 1.  The
correlation between initial income and growth rates is positive .22.
Table 2:  Summary  Statistics  on Basic  Growth  Rates
LSQ  Growth  rates by period  Initial  Final  Final!  Final/
growth  GDPPC  GDPPC  max  min
60-73 73-821  82- recent
Developing  Countries
Mean  1.64  2.68  1.74  0.10  1385  2639  0.82  2.04
Median  1.51  2.72  1.99  -0.13  1103  1869  0.88  1.61
Std. Dev.  1.98  2.20  3.22  2.94  1089  2696  0.18  1.37
Developed  Countries
Mean  2.90  4.261 2.05  2.47  5430  12665  0.981  2.69
Median  2.86  3.97  1.79  2.10  5553  13118  l.Oj  2.42
Std.Dev.  1.05  1.57  1.51  1.14  2368  3062  0.04  0.98
The gap in growth rates between developed and LDCs grew substantially in the most
recent period.  Growth rates for the developed and LDC groups were 3.9 versus 2.7 (a gap of
1.2 points) in the 1960s, then in the post-oil shock period the growth rates were slightly lower
7for the developed, 1.79 versus 1.99 (a gap of -.2 in favor of LDCs).  But since 1982  the
growth rates have been 2.1 for the developed  and negative  (-.13) for the LDCs, a growth gap
of 2.2 points  4.  This confirms  that the period since sometime  in the 1980s  has been very bad
indeed for the LDCs, with the important  exception  of the two largest countries  India and
China'.
The divergence  of per capita incomes has been more rapid in the last decade than either
over the very long-run of history or over of the period from 1960-19826.  This must be true
historically  because  the growth of the developed  countries  has been quite stable at around 2
percentage  points while the lowest growth could have been over the very long-run is zero, so
that the current growth gap of 2 percent in the developed  and negative in the LDCs must be at
least slightly  larger.  On the other hand, since many of the poor countries  were very very poor
around 1960 they must have experienced  low growth rates historically. This implies
developing country growth rates of 2 percentage  points or more in the period after 1960 must
have been an acceleration  in growth relative to their historical  long-run rate and hence
divergence  was probably less rapid for some part of the post WWII period until the recent
4  In the 1997 World Development Report table I shows the population weighted average GNP per capita
growth for the decade  1985-95  for the "low income"  countries  (excluding  India and China)  was -1.4, for "lower
middle  income"  countries  growth  was -1.3, for "upper  middle  income"  countries .2, and for high income
countries  growth  was 1.9.
5 This  does mean  that we are focusing  on the growth experience  of countries  in the world rather  than the
growth  experience  of individuals  in  the world, in which  the growth  of India  and  China obviously  looms large.
6  This is important  in part because  the early round of studies  discussing  convergence  (conditional  and
otherwise)  were based on the version of the Penn World Tables  that gave data only  through 1985. Some  might
read something  ironic  into  the explosion  of the academic  economic  literature  on "convergence"  (albeit
"conditional")  during  exactly  the period in which  the world  may well have been  at its all time peak rate  of
divergence.
8growth deceleration  (discussed  below)  than it was in the 1870  to WWII period (Pritchett,
1997).
Table 2 also shows  the variance  in growth rates across countries  is much larger amongst
the LDCs than the developed  countries. The standard  deviation  of growth rates is around 1
percent for the developed  countries  and nearly twice as large, around 2 percent, for the LDCs.
Figure 1 shows  the scatter plot between initial income and subsequent  growth rate.  While the
positive correlation  between growth and initial income is barely visible, the enormously  larger
variance in growth rates of those countries  that began the period below P$3,000 is obvious and
striking.  This difference  in the variability  of growth rates between the two groups has also
grown recently  as the standard deviation  of growth in the developed  countries  for the most
recent period is 1.15 compared  to nearly 3 for the LDCs.  This reflects the contrasting
experience  of continued  growth in the (especially  East Asian) stars with a general, and at times
precipitous,  deceleration  of growth in most other countries 7.
The larger variance among  developing  countries  is seen in the extremes of growth. The
developed  countries' growth rates fall into a narrow range.  The fifth fastest, Greece, grew at
3.6 while the fifth slowest, Australia, grew at 2.0, a growth difference  of 1.6 percentage
points.  In contrast the fifth fastest growing LDC, Botswana,  grew at 6.0 percent while the
fifth slowest, Somalia,  fell at a pace of 1.36 percent, a growth difference  of over seven
7  The slow and decelerating  growth among  many of the poorest countries  (particularly  in Africa)
combined  with the continued  higher  than world average  growth  rates and absolute  convergence  in levels amongst
the "poorer" but still well-off  European  among  the countries  contributes  to an emerging  "twin peaks" in the
distribution  of world income  (Quah, 1997).
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GDPPC  (in  thousands)  x  104percentage  points 8. Growth differentials  of this magnitude  produce rapid shifts in relative
incomes. Korea has gone from having  less per capita income than Angola  to having ten times
more in just thirty years.
Table 3: Five highest and lowest growth rates, developed  and developing
Developing  Developed
Five Highest  Singapore  6.95  Malta  6.03
Korea  6.85  Japan  4.63
Taiwan  6.29  Cyprus  4.29
Hong Kong  6.15  Portugal  4.10
Botswana  6.03  Greece  3.61
Five Lowest  Somalia  -1.36  Australia  1.99
Angola  -1.97  Sweden  1.88
Madagascar  -2.12  USA  1.81
Mozambique  -2.25  Switzerland  1.49
Chad  -2.75  New Zealand  1.19
B) Growth  instability
After an examination  of trend rates of growth the next step is to notice that most countries'
GDPPC is not at all well characterized  by a single "trend" growth rate.  Examination  of the
statistics, and especially  of the graphs, reveals large shifts in growth rates.  These shifts are
localized  in episodes  of discrete  shifts in growth rates.  Ben-David  and Papell (1997)
introduced  the analysis of growth shifts which I simply  extend to all countries 9.
8  Of course  the absolute  magnitude  of the growth differential  between  the fastest  and slowest  is also larger
because  there are more LDCs than developed  countries  but this does not explain  all of the gap.
9  The major difference  between  my approach  and that of Ben-David  (1997)  is that  he reports summary
statistics  of growth  changes only  for those which are statistically  significant. I think  this confounds  two issues: of
the growth shift  and of the power of the test of the growth  shift. This problem  of statistical  power is especially
problematic  given  the information  below  about the differing  volatility  of the series.  The higher volatility  growth
series will be less able to detect a shift.  For two countries  with  equal magnitude  shifts  in growth rates but
differing  underlying  volatility,  one shift  might  be statistically  significant  and the other  not.
10The first noticeable  aspect of growth shifts is the enormous deceleration  of growth.  The
typical country  has seen growth decelerate  by 2 percentage  points.  For the developed
countries  this is largely two phenomena,  a global deceleration  following  the oil shocks and the
deceleration  of the European  countries  from their rapid post-WWII  catch-up  of the 1950s  and
1960s. In the LDCs, there are a larger variety of experiences,  which we discuss below.
A second  interesting  feature is that the differences  in growth rates within countries over
time are large.  The standard deviation  of the shift is an enormous  3.85 percentage  points and
among  the LDCs the average  of the absolute  value of the shift in growth rates is 3.4
percentage  points.  This is much larger than the cross sectional  variance of 2.0 or the median
growth rate for LDCs of 1.51. Fifty-five  of the 125  countries  had growth rates either
decelerate  or accelerate  by more than 3 percentage  points within the period.  Figure 2 shows
these shifts in growth, identifying  those that decelerated  or accelerated  by more than two
percentage  points, as well as the stability at high rates of the East Asian stars.
11Figure  2:  Growth  rates  before  and  after  break  point
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Growth  after  breakTable 4: Statistics  on Instability  of growth rates
Summary  from "best break" analysis  R-Squared  of
Year  Pct. Point  Growth  Growth  trend
Shift  Before  After
Developing  countries
Mean  1977  -2.58  2.62  0.05  .58
Median  1978  -2.21  2.86  -0.04  .67
Std. Dev.  4  3.53  2.23  2.99  .32
Developed
Mean  1975  -1.91  4.07  2.17  .94
Median  1974  -1.93  3.83  1.84  .95
Std. Dev.  4  1.46  1.53  1.04  .03
These large shifts in growth rates imply GDPPC is not, in general, well characterized  by a
single exponential  trend.  The final column of table 4 shows  the R-squared  of fitting a single
time trend through  y or how much of the time series behavior of y is "just the trend."  This
statistic  perhaps best captures the striking differences  in the behavior  of output in the
developed  and developing  countries. In the developed  countries  the median is .95 and the
standard  deviation  only .03.  For nearly every developed  country the total time series variance
of y is summarized  in a single number: the average  growth rate (figure 3).  While there
obviously OECD  countries  have business cycle fluctuations  and shifts in growth, these are not
the dominant features  of the evolution  of y.
In contrast, for the developing  countries "growth" is not  just the trend.  The median trend
R-squared  is only .67 and the standard deviation  is .32.  For forty percent of the LDCs the
trend R-squared  is less than .5.  The box-plots in figure 3 show the maximum  and mininum  of
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1-LDC,  2  =DCthe two groups, with the top and bottom of the boxes showing  the 75th and 25th percentiles
and a line at the median. The strikingly  different  behavior  of the two groups is well illustrated
as while the developed  countries  are very narrowly  grouped between .9 and 1, amongst  the
LDCs the trend R-squared  values are distributed  almost evenly  from 0 to 1.  The interpretation
of low R-squareds  is complicated,  as it involves  both the magnitude  and the deviations  from
the trend and leads to an analysis  of the patterns of growth.
Patterns  of growth Examination  of the statistics  on the levels and shifts in growth rates
and of the individual  graphs reveals six distinct patterns of growth, based on the speed of
growth before and after the statistically  identified  structural  break in growth. Table 5 places
each country into one of these patterns.
*  "Steep hills": These 11 countries  had steady and rapid growth (above  3 percent in
both periods). This set is the high performing  East Asian countries, a few European
periphery  economies  (Cyprus, Ireland, Malta) and besides that, just Botswana. In these
countries  the trend is high and stable and hence is everything, like Thailand (.99)
(figure  4). (In the figure for Thailand  all of the growth statistics  reported on the graph
are labeled  as a guide to the rest of the country figures given in the text (the others are
are available  on request)).
*  "Hills": These 27 countries  had growth above 1.5 percent in each period'°. Like the
USA (figure  5) most of the OECD countries  are in this category (14 of 23).  A few
10 Actually  the exact number  used is 1.48 percent (rounded  up to 1.5 interest  because 1.48 sounds  silly). In
any case the cut-off  points  are somewhat  arbitrary and are rigged  according  to the outcomes  that corresponded  to
my intuitive  feel, particularly  to retain the USA as a "Hill" not a "Plateau."
13steady growers in the developing  world (Costa Rica, Pakistan)  also are in this category.
For these countries  trend R-Squared  is also typically  high (.91 for Pakistan)  (figure 6).
*  "Plateaus": These 16 countries  had growth above 1.5 percent before their structural
break and growth less than 1.5 but greater than zero, thereafter. These countries are a
mixed bag.  The classic  case is Brazil with growth of 4 percent until 1980 and .66
percent afterwards  (figure  7).  Other countries  are less true plateaus  and more
borderline  hills, like Sweden  with growth of 3.36 percent before and 1.4 percent after.
*  "Mountains":  These 33 countries  had growth above 1.5 percent before their trend
break, but negative  growth rates afterwards. This category  includes most of the oil
exporting  countries  (Nigeria (figure  8), Gabon, Algeria, Saudi  Arabia), a number  of
commodity  exporters  that experienced  positive,  then negative  price shocks (Jamaica,
Guyana, Cote d' Ivoire (figure  9), Zambia), many Latin American  countries  affected
by the debt crisis (Argentina  (figure 10), Bolivia,  Paraguay). The "mountains" include
some countries  with "cliffs" with sharp drops over a couple of years usually cases of
war and/or civil unrest (Liberia, Mozambique,  Nicaragua  (figure 11)). The "mountain"
countries  had a sharp break in their growth experience  and hence often a low trend R-
Squared  (e.g., C6te d'Ivoire .013, Argentina, .204, Nicaragua .190). For instance
Jamaica's growth for the whole period is .8 percent, but was 3.76 percent before 1976
and -.36 percent after and the overall trend R-Squared  is only .18 (figure 12).
*  "Plains": These 17 countries  had growth below 1.5 percent both before or after their
structural break.  Nearly all of these countries (14 of 17) are in Sub-Saharan  Africa.
Senegal  is a classic  pure "plain" with continuous  stagnation  and a reasonably  steady
14growth rate around zero (.18) hence y is reasonably  characterized  by a trend growth but
with low R-squareds  (.213) (figure 13). Included  within "plains" are countries  with
consistently  negative  growth rates, such as Mozambique,  who might be well be
characterized  as "valleys".
* "Denver"':  These 7 countries  did not have growth above 1.5 percent before their
structural  break, but did afterwards. This class includes  a number of clear success case
"The only geographic  metaphor  I would  think of was Denver  where  the Great Plains
meet the Rocky  Mountain.
15accelerators  like Indonesia  (figure 14) and Mauritius  (figure 15), some less clear cut
cases. At times the "acceleration"  was from low or negative  levels to respectable,  but
Table 5: Classification  of countries  by growth  rate level and change
Class  Total  Developed  Developing
East  South  MENA  LAC  SSA
Asia  Asia
Steep Hills  I  I  CYP, IRL, JPN,  HKG,  KOR,  BWA
MLT  MYS,  SGP,  (1)
(gb> 3, ga>3)  (4)  THA, TWN
(CHN) (6)  _
Hills  27  AUS, AUT, BEL,  CHN,  BGD, PAK  ISR, TUN,  BRB, COL,  TZA
CAN, CHE,  DEU,  MMR, PHL  (2)  TUR  CRI, MEX  (1)
(gb>l.5,  DNK,  ESP, FIN,  (3)  (3)  (4)
g >1.5)  FRA, GRC, ITA,
a 8 >l.)  *PRT,  USA
(14)
Plateaus  16  NLD. ISL.  NZL.  MAR  BRA, DOM,  ETH, GMB,
SWE  (1)  GTM,SLV  GNB, KEN,
(gb>  1 -5,  (4)  (4)  LSO, MWI,
O<g 8<l.5)  swz
Mountains  33  GBR  NAM, PNG  DZA, EGY,  ARG, BOL,  CIV, CMR,
(1)  (2)  IRN, IRQ,  ECU,  COG, GAB,
(gb>  *  -5,  JOR, SAU,  GUY, HND,  LIB, MOZ,
g <0)  SYR (7)  JAM, NIC,  NER, NGA,
ga<O)  PAN, PER,  SLE,  TGO,
PRY, SUR,  ZAF,  ZAR,
(TT)O  ZMB
(12)
!_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _ ___________ ____________  ____________ (i  3)
Plains  17  NPL  HTI,  VEN  AGO, BDI,
(1)  (2)  BEN,  CAF,
gb<1.5,  GIN, HVO,





________________  ___________  ___________  ___________  ~~~~~~(14)
Accelerators  7  IDN  IND, LKA  CHL,  URY  GHA, MUS
g&<1-5,  (1)  (2)  (2)  (2)
ga>1.5)  __I
Number:  111  23  12  5  11  24  36
The simple  procedure and its classification  scheme  do capture some of the well know
stylized  facts about differences  in growth across regions. The OECD is nearly all in the hills
or steady  hills groups (18 of 23) with the exceptions  mostly  borderline. Nearly all of the
16"plains" are countries in SSA (14 of 17) but not all SSA are "plains" (14 of 36) a nearly equal
amount are mountains  (13 of 36).  This is in contrast with two other regions with slow overall
growth, Latin America  with very few "plains" (2 of 24) but many "mountains"  (12 of 24)
and MENA, with 7 of 11 mountains.
The classification  does throw up some anomalies,  which reveal some limitations  of the
method. For instance, China is a consistent  growth performer  because the data only allow one
break and so the disasters  of the Great Leap Forward are smoothed  over.  Similarly, the data
breaks Tanzania's growth at 1980  and gives two reasonably  high growth sub-periods,
smoothing  over the disastrous period from 1978  to 1984. Great Britian is a "mountain"
because  the data break its very smooth series at the peak of a cycle in 1987.
One implication  of the fact of large changes in growth rates is that there is relatively little
correlation in growth rates across  periods.  Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett, and Summers  (1993)
was devoted  entirely to this point.  Although  casual  discussions  of  "high performing" and
"low performing" countries  makes it seem as if relatively  time-persistent  characteristics
accounted  for the bulk of cross-national  growth variation,  the correlation  over time periods
across countries  is actually quite low.  The cross-national  (rank) correlation  of countries'
growth "before" and "after" their structural break is only .24.  The low correlation is also
seen in the shifts over time: between 60-73 and 73-82 is the correlation is .24, and between
73-82 and 82-most  recent only .32.
17Figure  4:  Evolution  of  (In)  GDP per  person  for  THA
LO
943  3942  4.2  4.43
wmL'^--  943  3942-4.2  l-.0.  598
0  ~  1985  4.05  7.P6
std,  cv  of  fd  3.30  0.74
Lo  s.d.  dev  trd,  R2  4.63  0.987
F  Avg,  Max FE(10,3)  6.62  1  9.4
p.'  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  42
an
CD
to1960  1964  1  199 ~~~~~~~~~4  . /-
Ln
1  1960  1964  1  968  1  972  1  976  1  980  1  984  1  988  1  992Figure  5:  Evolution  of  (In)  GDP  per  person  for  USA
O  . 7945  I  I-'2
9895  17945  1.8  1.82
o  9895  18095  1.8  1.0_
- 1968  3.43  1.49  -1.94
r-  std,  cv  of  fd  2.49  1.34
-s.d.  dev  trd,  R2  3.90  0.953
Avg,  Max  FE(10,3)  4.48  10.3
O  ~~2.87
a 
1960  1964  1966  1972  1976  1960  1964  1988  1992Figure  6:  Evolution  of  (In)  GDP per  person  for  PAK
I.'.  ,  . . .
638  1432  2.2  2.48
O  - 638  1432  2.2  1.0
"?  -1972  3.91  2.65  -1.27
std,  cv  of  fd  4.12  1.63
eO  s.d.  dev  trd,  R2  6.84  0.909
e  Avg,  Max  FE(10,3)  6.50  27.6
2.36
S~~~~~~~~~~~  2 .8
(.0
(D 
0  1960  1964  1968  1972  1976  1980  1984  1988  1992Figure  7:  Evolution  of  (In)  GDP  per  person  for  BRA
0')
- 1784  3882  2.2  2.38
r-  1784  4317  2.2  0.9
c  - 1973  4.07  0.66  -3.40
O-y  std,  cv  of  fd  4.63  1.91
'n  -s.d.  dev  trd,  R2  13.29  0.839




16  1919  7  9216  1018181
1960  1  964  1  968  1  972  1  976  1  980  1  984  1988  1992Figure  8:  Evolution  of  (In)  GDP per  person  for  NGA
oo
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  '  '  '  '  '  '  '
567  978  1.7  1.67
00  -482  1515  2.0  0.6
CNrs~1977  6.24  -3.755-9-999
std,  cv  of  fd  10.90  6.40
oo  s.d.  dev  trd,  R2  27.66  0.428










O  1960  1964  1968  1972  1976  1980  1984  1988  1992Figure  9:  Evolution  of  (In)  GDP per  person  for  CIV
F)  |  ~~~I  I  X  I  '  I  r  I  l  I  l  I  '
c0
1120  1104  1.0  -0.04
- 1104  2237  1.0  0.5
2  1980  3.11  -4.11  -7.22
oo
std,  cv  of  fd  6.46  143.76
s.d.  dev  trd,  R2  18.72  0.013




1960  1  964  1  968  1  972  1  976  1  980  1984  1  988  1  992Figure  1  0:  Evolution  of  (In)  GDP  per  person  for  ARC
00
CD)
- 4462  4706  1.1  0.17
CD-0
C  4293  6506  1.1  0.7
o  - 1981  1.80  -1.80  -3.60
s  std,  cv  of  fd  5.32  29.98
. s.d.  dev  trd,  R2  9.85  0.204







S  . LE  - 1 . S~~-.1  co 




(-O 1  960  1  964  19  68  1972  1  976  1980  1  984  1  988  1  992Figure  11:  Evolution  of  (In)  GDP  per  person  for  NIC
(9~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  I  I  l  I  l  F 
00
1606  1294  0.8  -0.69
+j  1294  2761  1.0  0.5
W6 1979  1.59  -3.89  -5.48
>  std,  cv  of  fd  9.27  12.87
_  s.d.  dev  trd,  R2  18.14  0.190




r  (,  //  -;S;  _ r ~~~~~~~~~~51  9 
1  960  1 964  1 9 68  1 972  1 976  1 980  1 984  988  992  I
>  1960  1964  1968  1972  1976  1980  1984  1988  1992Figure  12:  Evolution  of  (In)  GDP  per  person  for  JAM
cc
co
- 1773  2440  1.4  1.00
>  _1771  3099  1.4  0.8
oo  1976  3.76  -0.36  -4.12
oo  std,  cv  of  fd  4.93  4.79
n  -s.d.  dev  trd,  R2  13.46  0.178
Co  -Avg,  Max  FE(10,3)  11.50  22.1
co
00) [  .n\,  \  ~~~~~2.69 
19
>1960  1964  1968  1972  1976  1980  1984  1988  1992Figure  13:  Evolution  of  (In)  GDP  per  person  for  SEN
N  I  ,  l  ,  I  ,  I  ,  ,  _  .,  l  I  l  I
1047  1120  1.1  0.21
-t  1036  1203  1.1  0.9
1969  0.40  0.17  -0.23
std,  cv  of  fd  4.23  19.44
.+j  s.d.  dev  trd,  R2  3.21  0.2 13
O  -Avg,  Max  FE(10,3)  3.92  10.5
(0
0  O.  1  6  1.00  -0.49
00
s  1960  1964  1968  1972  1976  1980  1984  1988  1992Figure  1  4:  Evolution  of  (In)  GDP  per  person  for  IDN
638  2102  3.3  3.68
- 608  2102  3.5  1.0
u  1967  -1.00  5.1  3  6.1  4  3-29
std,  cv  of  fd  3.83  1.03
s.d.  dev  trd,  R2  9.55  0.953
_  Avg,  Max  FE(10,3)  8.22  16.2
v  1960 196  196  192  176  16098496899.442
1960  1964  1968  1972  1976  1980  1984  1988  1992Figure  15:  Evolution  of  (In)  GDP  per  person  for  MUS
0o
N  '  '  '  '  '  '  t'  I  '  ''''
CD
- 2862  6167  2.2  2.35
03 
O  _2398  6167  2.6  1.0
a-  1974  -1.21  2.84  4.05
oo  std,  cv  of  fd  8.04  3.35
Co -s.d.  dev  trd,  R2  14.39  0.715













"  1960  1964  1968  1972  1976  1950  1984  1988  1992C) Growth  volatility
If a time series can be well represented  by a single stable growth rate then measuring  the
volatility around that trend is relatively straightforward' 2. However, since, the previous
section  has shown  that nearly every country exhibits a large trend shift, simple  measures  based
on the residuals from a trend will not give a good indication  of the pure volatility of output.
For instance, one country  might have large volatility  around a stable trend while another has
very stable output in each of two sub-periods,  but around two different  trends, nevertheless  the
two countries  would appear to have similar "volatility".
Because of this difficulty  in measuring volatility  with shifting  trends, I use three
approaches. First, the standard approach  combining  instability  and volatility:  the standard
deviation  of the time series deviations  of output from a single trend.  Second,  I calculate  the
coefficient  of variation and standard  deviation  of the first differences  of y.  Also, to capture
the possibility  of stability  around a trend with a single or few shifts, I calculate  the median of
the absolute value of the  second  differences' 3. Third, in the spirit of an intuitive notion of
series "forecastability"  I calculate  how well three year ahead y is forecast based on a trend
calculated  off the previous  ten years (so that history gradually  erases the effect of past trend
shifts). The average  and the maximum  of this forecast error are reported.
I2  I use the simple  trend and deviations  throughout  instead  of treating  the series as difference  stationary. I
suspect  that similar  findings  about the differences  in volatility  and shifts in the drift parameter  between  different
countries  would  be found  with that approach  as well.
13  Suppose  a country  grew at g, in period 1  and g2 in period  2, g,>>g 2 but was perfectly  stable  within  each
period. Then  the standard  deviation of first differences  would  still  be high  but second  differences  (changes  in the
growth  rate  would  be zero except  one period).
18However  measured, volatility  is much higher in the LDCs"'. Table 6 shows  that the
median standard  deviation  of the deviation  from trend is twice as high in LDCs as in the
developed  countries (.10 versus .05).  The median forecast errors are also twice as large in
LDCs (.094 vs .054) and the typical "worst" forecast  error is also twice as large (.28 versus
.14). The coefficient  of variation of the (natural)  log first differences  of GDPPC is four times
as high in a typical (median)  LDC as in a developed  country (4.3 vs 1.0)15. This is both
because  the standard  deviation  of the ln first differences  is higher (.06) while the average  LFD
is (.03) is lower.  Figure 16 shows  the scatter plot of one measure of volatility, the standard
deviation  of the deviations  from a single trend rate of growth, and initial per capita income.
14 The correlations  amongst  the various measures  of volatility  are high, but not so high as to suggest  there are
not real differences  in some cases as to what aspect  of growth variation  they are capturing,  but in ways I have  yet
to understand.
15The  average  CV is 10 times as high because  in several  countries  growth  is near very zero and hence is
probably  a misleading  as a sumrnmary  statistic  of central  tendency.
19Figure  1 6:  Volatility  (s.d.  of  dev  from  trend)  and  per  captia  income
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Initial  per  capita  income  x  104Table 6: Summary statistics on the volatility of growth
Std. Dev.  First Differences  Median  Forecast Error
of Dev.  abs. Value  (3,10)
from  second*
Single  C.V.  Std.Dev.  Mean  differences  Mean  Maximum
Trend  l  1  (*100)  l
Developing countries
Mean  0.112  10.597  0.065  0.018  0.7  0.114  0.314
Median  0.1  4.314  0.059  0.014  0.5  0.095  0.283
Std. Dev.  0.052  19.449  0.027  0.015  0.7  0.053  0.166
Developed countries
Mean  0.063  1.14  0.031  0.029  0.4  0.056  0.153
Median  0.054  1.038  0.027  0.028  0.3  0.054  0.135
Std. Dev  0.026  0.473  0.013  0.011  0.4  0.022  0.086
III) So you want to run a growth regression?
In the second  half I move away from the description  and summary  statistics  about the time
series of per capita growth and into some empirically  based, but speculative,  discussion  of
empirical research into the determinants  of economic  growth. Let me lay my cards on the
table.  I think there is a move afoot to expand  the empirical  growth regression  research by
"exploiting  the panel nature of the data" at least partially  based on a naive notion of "using all
the data" so as to "not throw away information." I argue this move to panel regressions  is
unlikely  to add any useful knowledge  about long-run growth. The instability  and volatility  of
output imply the move to shorter and shorter time periods is likely to lead to a tangle of
confusions  about dynamics, specification,  endogeneity  and statistical  power that will ultimately
confuse,  not clarify, the issues of growth, and especially  development.
20Some set-up of necessary. A theory of economic  growth relates the level of income at
each point in time (and hence its growth rate) to some  other set of variables. There are three
time dimensions  of "growth" traditionally  distinguished  based on the notion of the equilibrium
level of income as a function of underlying  X variables denoted,  y*(X), and the actual level of
output,  y.  There are "steady state" differences  in growth, different  growth rates of y*(.
There are "transitional  dynamics"  which themselves  can be of two types.  That is even if the
growth  of y*() is unchanged,  if the level of y*() changes  then there will be "growth"
differences  as y adapts to its new steady state level.  In this sense any economic  reform or once
off shock has "growth" consequences. Moreover as the equilibrium  growth path of
y*changes  there will be dynamics  of the actual evolution  of y as it reaches the new growth
path.  Finally there are "business  cycle" changes such that even in the absence of shifts in the
equilibrium  value of y*there can be dynamics  in y.
There are several  problems  that arise from mixing  the quite different time scales of these
three types of "growth" in growth regressions. The modeling  behind "growth" regressions
mostly  claims to be about long-run equilibrium  growth (or levels)  and yet there is mostly very
little discussion  of either business cycles  or of the dynamics  of adjustments  to either level or
growth rate changes in the "theories" of growth regressions.
There has been a remarkable  proliferation  of variables included  in growth regressions  with
literally  hundreds of variables  proposed, Xavier Sala-I-Martin  (1997) alone has claimed  to
have run over two million  growth regressions. This means some classification  is necessary  to
talk about regressions.  For the present discussion  I classify the myriad of right hand side
"X" variables  by three features:  exogeneity  persistence  and whether it is or is not a factor of
21production. Persistence  ranges from country specific  time-invariant  variables (e.g latitude,
access to the sea) to quantities  that evolve  very slowly (e.g. population  size, human  capital
stock)  to volatile series (e.g. black market premia, capital inflows, terms of trade). The typical
"X" variables  in growth regressions  can be further classified into two types: "production
function and "reduced form".  The production  function  variables are reasonably
straightforward  and the main differences  arise in the time series specification  (levels  or
changes  of income  on flows or stocks, and measurement  (particularly  of human  capital). The
"reduced  form" regression  covers a huge variety from whether  countries  have a coast (Sachs
and Gallup, 1998)  to whether citizens  return a lost wallet (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
22Table 7: My "gut feeling" classification  of variables included  in growth regressions
Persistence:
Endogeneity:
High  Medium  Volatile
Low  "structural": geographic  investments,  capital  stocks  "Shocks":  terms of trade,
(land  locked, distance  from  spillovers  from financial
the equator),  climatic  crisis, weather.
(rainfall),  resource
endowment  (minerals)
"institutional":  (e.g. ethnic
diversity,  political  system,
language,  colonial
experience,  type of legal
system).
Medium  "policy": quantities  over
which  some individual  or
entity  has more or less
direct  control  (e.g. tariff
rates).
High  "intermediate  outcome":  "intermediate  outcome"
(e.g. trade ratio, inflation,  (e.g., FDI, export  growth,
budget  deficit, financial  budget  deficit,  black market
depth).  premium).
With this classification  of three meanings  of "growth" and the classification  of variables  by
persistence  and exogeneity  of the properties of the various variables included  in "growth"
regressions  in place argue that, given the time series  properties of the various variables, a
move to the use of shorter panels is more likely to hurt than help studies of long-run growth.
Consider two types of variables:  high persistence, low volatility  and endogeneity  and those
with high volatility  and hence low persistence,  but which are potentially  endogenous.
High Persistence,  low volatility  variables. With variables  whose values change  only very
slowly  over time, such as whether or not a country is landlocked,  or population  size, or
political  or institutional  characteristics,  or the stock of education  of the labor force, or
23inequality, or etc. a move to shorter panels, particularly  with the use of fixed effects is almost
certain  not to help, for three reasons.
First, the lack of identification  of time-invariant  effects  using fixed effects in panel data is
merely the limiting  case of the decreasing  statistical  power as the "between" variance is
discarded. With high persistence  variables the fixed effect sweeps  out most of the variation in
the variable. For instance,  using a panel of data at five year intervals, take the fraction of the
total variation that is "explained"  by country fLxed  effects  as a measure of a variable's
"persistence." Table 8 compares  this for several variables  that have been used in growth
regression. Whereas  at five year intervals  the fraction  of variance  that is within countries is
.73 for growth, it is much less, only .22 for investment  ratios, only .07 for the level of
education  and only .02 for the size of populations. Other growth "determinants"  have similar
very strong persistence,  like measures  of democracy  and civil liberties, and income inequality.
In the recent Squire and Deininger  (1997)  data set over 90 percent of the total variation is
cross-national.
This means that using fixed effects will "sweep out" large amounts  of the variation  of
many of the interesting  r.h.s. variables, while maintaining  the volatile component  of economic
growth on the l.h.s.  In column  4 of table 8 I report the how much lower the t-statistics  would
be using a Monte Carlo evaluation  of a simple  bivariate  regression  with 100 "countries" and 6
"periods" to mimic using five year panels with the existing data sets.  Basically,  the power of
the t-tests would  fall proportionate  to the square of the ratio of the fraction  explained  by fixed
effects. For a variable with the persistence  of investment  rates using fixed effects would cut t-
statistics  in half.  With variable  with the persistence  of the level of education  a five year
24fixed effects in the panel would cut t-statistics  to a third of their level in the cross section,
implying  that in the cross section  the t-statistic  would have to have been 6 to not be below 2
with the lower power of fixed effects. For quite stable variables, like population  size, where
nearly all the variation is cross national the t-statistics  would be a fifth as large, so that it is
essentially  impossible  to precisely identify  the impact  of these variables  using fixed effect
techniques.
Table 8: Differences  in persistence  between economic  growth and typical "explanatory"
variables in growth regressions  and the implications  for statistical  power
Variable:  Number  of  Ratio Within  Ratio of t-statistics  from
countries,  Country to  fixed effects versus cross
number  of  Total  section regressions  for a
observations  Variance  r.h.s variable  with the within
to total variance indicated
(based on Monte Carlo)
Growth of GDP per capita  126/756  .73
Population Growth  126/756  .31  .62
Investment  Rates  126/756  .22  .54
Level of Education  84/504  .07  .32
Level of Population  (In)  126/756  .02  .18
The predicted  ratio comes from a Monte Carlo simulation  which simulates  data for 100
"countries" over 6 "periods" with "growth" and the rhs variables  having  different time
series persistence. By varying the degree of persistence  of rhs while holding  the persistence
of growth at .75 a tight predicted  relationship  with t-statistics  is calculated.
Second, there is the well known  problem from panel econometrics  (pointed  out early, and
subsequently  often, by Grilliches)  that if the cross sectional  variance of persistence  is large
relative to the time series variance  and if the measurement  error variance has a time series
component,  then the use of fixed effects  exacerbates  the degree of measurement  error and
25hence the attenuation  bias.  Especially  with high persistence  variables this effect can be
enormous. Suppose  the variance of measurement  error were constant for each measurement
while the true variation is mostly time persistent. The use of fixed effects with variables with
persistence  characteristics  of those in table 8 could easily increase  attenuation  bias due to
measurement  error by afactor of ten.
The third problem is the dynamic  misspecification  involved  in arbitrarily changing  the time
span over which the regression  is estimated.  This actually  raises three problems  with
dynamics. The first is the dynamic  mis-specification  of the time scale over which the effects
in various growth models operate. While some  growth effects might take only several years,
others might easily take decades. Arbitrarily  parsing time series into shorter periods assumes
the dynamics  are invariant. Second,  using the higher frequency  components  of variables
whose time series have persistence  implicitly  assumes that the impact  of transitory  and
permanent  changes  are exactly  alike. In most dynamic  macroeconomic  models  this is not true.
The response  to shocks  of the same magnitude  can be completely  different, if one is perceived
as permanent  and other temporary. By taking out the "fixed" effect the data essentially  only
uses temporary  innovations  to identify  coefficients,  but this approach  may completely  miss
important  effect of permanent  shifts.
Finally, by using only the smallish,  transient deviations  to identify  parameters one must
believe (probably  to a psychologically  unhealthy  extent, but I'll leave  that to professionals)  that
the postulated  model is not just roughlt, but exactly right.  The growth impact  of some
variables  might be different  when occasioned  by one underlying  factor than by another. The
impact  of an increased  fiscal deficit due to a terms trade shock leading to temporary  revenue
26falls might be different than that of a deficit caused  by expenditure  surges (say a defense
buildup). Using long-period  averages  gives the coefficient  on growth of the "typical" deficit.
In contrast the use of only the high frequency  assumes  either that the temporary  deviations
have exactly the pattern of causes as the cross sectional  variation or that the specified  model is
exactly  right so that the growth impact is invariant. Either of those is highly implausible.
The combination  of these three problems  of lower power, increased  attenuation  bias, and
dynamic  misspecification  mean that two of the common  empirical  findings  from moving to
higher frequency  data are actually of very little use.  One common  finding  that many cross
sectional  findings  are not "robust" to the use of fixed effects, in the mechanistic  sense that
variables  that are "significant"  in the cross section  using long period averages  are not
"significant"  in fixed effect panels. For instance, while the long-period  regressions  typically
find that the level of education  or enrollment  rates (conditional  on initial income)  is a
significant  determinant  of subsequent  growth (Barro and Sala-I-Martin,  1997),  panel
regressions  typically  find the level of education  is insignificant  (Islam, 1995)'6.  Similarly,
new papers find that cross-sectional  results on the negative  impact  of inequality  on economic
growth are not robust (even in sign) when one uses five year panels (Forbes, 1997).
Between  the effects of lower power and larger attenuation  bias a "failure to reject" with
panels a coefficient  found to be significant  in longer periods is simply  uninformative  unless
accompanied  by both a serious analysis of power, say along  the lines of Andrews (1989)  and a
serious analysis  of measurement  error.
16 The growth-human  capital  regressions  that  mix growth  with levels  or enrollment  rates have  their own,
extremely  serious,  empirical  and  theoretical  problems  (Pritchett,  1996).
27But certainly  the models  that propose a mechanism  running from inequality  to tax rates to
investment  to growth (Persson  and Tabellini, 1994),  or inequality  to political  instability  to
investment  to growth (Alesina  and Perotti, 1993), are not meant to be tested using a
contemporaneous relationship between short-run deviations of growth from its long-term
average  and short-run  deviations  of inequality. The time scales for the channels  whereby
inequality  affects  growth require relatively long lasting  shifts in growth, and relative long time
periods (decades  at least) for the impact  to be manifest  in increased growth.
The second  empirical  problem typically  found with the use of the higher frequencies  is that
the regression  parameters are not stable or "robust" over time.  That is, if regressions  are run
decade  by decade or even worse, five year period by five year period, it is common  that the
significant,  and even sign of coefficients  are not the same as using the averaged  data.  Kelley
and Schmidt  (1994)  regress the growth of GDP per capita on population  growth decade  by
decade and find a mildly negative  coefficient  in the 1960's, mildly positive in the 1970's,
while in the 1980s  the coefficient  was larger and negative. Similarly, a recently  published
paper (Keefer  and Knack, 1997)  on social characteristics  and growth shows substantial
parameter instability  as the regression  on growth after 1980  finds a different sign for their
"social" variables  that regressions  on growth prior to 1980, even though one would suspect
that the underlying  social characteristics  changed  only very slowly  (they have only have a
measure at one point in time).  Similarly,  one of the best researched  findings  in the growth
literature is the connection  between financial  depth and characteristics  of the banking sector
and growth (Levine, 1997). However, this relationship  shifts in decade  by decade data.
28Vamvamkidis  (1997)  looks at the relationship  between growth and trade over the very long-run
with data going back into the 1900's and finds that the coefficient  shifts over time.
So what? So nothing. The parameter instability  that has been found so far is not
particularly  informative.  The degree of parameter instability  is hard to reconcile  with any of
the coefficients  having identified  a "true" invariant structural  parameter that links growth at all
frequencies:  short, medium  and long and other variables. But, how does one interpret these
parameter shifts? Is the underlying structural relationship  that produces  the reduced form
shifting? Does this reflect shifts in the temporary  or in the steady state components  of growth?
Do these shifts reveal true strategic  opportunities  (it was good to be open in the 1960's but not
the 1930's? It was good to be financially  deep in the 1980's but not the 1970s?). But to make
assertions of this sort about varying relationships  between  determinants  and growth one would
need not only to have a growth theory that establishes  links between r.h.s. "stuff" and growth
but much more.  To make claims of this type one needs a theory that specifies  not only what
relationships  are, but how these relationships  shifts over time:  otherwise  with time varying
parameters  it is impossible  to say which is the relevant parameter.
Low Persistence, high volatility variables.  Now imagine a typical variable that, like
growth has high volatility  and low persistence  over short to medium term horizons.  In this
case panel regressions  face two different, but equally serious problems: endogeneity  bias and
structural  mis-specification.
Endogeneity  bias.  A problem with very many "reduced  form" growth regressions  is that
short panels exacerbate  the endogeneity  problem. That is suppose  that there are long-run
29growth (g 1) and business  cycle (gb)  effects  in the determination  of current output for each
country i at time period t.
y  f  y  i*(1  +g,i)  *(1  +gb 
Suppose  there is a relationship  that runs from the country specific  average  of an independent
variable  and long-run growth:
gl  =p  *x
But suppose  that the average  level of the variable x was determined  as a "policy" choice  but
that there is a cyclical  component  to x that is driven by the "business  cycle" component  of
growth (or both by some third factor, like political  disruption, terms of trade shocks, etc.)
(Xei _  Xi  )  =  *  gbi
Throwing some random  disturbance  terms into each of these equations  and doing Monte Carlo
shows  (the obvious)  that if one is trying to identify  the long run growth impact, j,  then
moving from the long-run  cross section  to fixed effects  on panels messes up completely. One
can easily reverse the sign of P and instead  of identifying  the long-run  of x on growth identify
the short-run  impact  of growth on x.
This has implications  for all types of growth regressions  because, except for "structural"
variables in the reduced form regressions,  nearly all of the included  right hand side variables
are potentially  endogenous,  and for many of them there is reason to believe  that the cyclical
relationship  may well be different  than the long-run  relationship. So for instance, imagine  a
30regression  run between  growth and budget deficit and imagine  a country was pursuing  a
counter-cyclical  fiscal policy.  Then one could easily find a large negative  growth "effect" of
budget deficits that had nothing to do with long-run  growth. Another example  are regressions
of foreign direct investment,  since  the level of FDI is highly responsive  to current and
expected  growth in the recipient  country then moving  to shorter and shorter time periods
exacerbates  the endogeneity  problems. This means one would expect to find a higher observed
growth "impact" of FDI even if FDI had exactly  to save returns as any other investment.
An even more likely possibility is that moving to fixed effects increases  the bias due to
omitted  variables in the specification.  Suppose  there are shocks; wars or political  disruption,
terms of trade movements,  adverse weather, that affect the functioning  of the economy  in a
variety of ways and that these shocks are more highly correlated  with the time series
dimension  of the included  X variables  than with the cross sectional  variance.
Take variables like the black market premium, or inflation, or the fiscal deficit, or
openness  that I would call "semi-reduced"  as they are themselves  outcome  variables. They
are not strictly speaking "policy" variables as they are jointly determined  by shocks  and by
policy responses  to shocks. It is easy to tell a story in which an exogenous  shock, like adverse
terms of trade, or bad weather or political  disruption  could simultaneously  affect output and
these variables. For instance  a large terms of trade shock in a commodity  dependent  country
could simultaneously  reduce government  revenues (and hence increase  the budget deficit if
expenditures  are not equally flexible), reduce export earnings and hence, unless the exchange
rate regime was fully accommodating,  decrease  financeable  imports  by more than import
demand and hence raise the black market premium, and lower observed "openness.  "  All the
31while the shock itself may adversely affect  actual (or measured)  short-run GDP growth" 7. The
point of long-period  regressions  is to smooth over these shocks. While simple averaging
might not be the optimal  filter, it is quite possibly better than no filter at all.
Now while it is true that in econometric  theory these problems  of joint endogeneity  and
possible  even misspecification  can be solved  by finding  adequate  econometric  estimation and
adequate  instruments. Perhaps  this is a useful tack, particularly if it stimulates  researchers  to
think hard about the underlying  processes  and discover new and clever instruments. However,
so far most of the work has depended  on more or less arbitrary restrictions  on the time series
properties  of the data for identification. I am doubtful that GMM identified  off dynamics  is
the solution and have been made more, rather than less, doubtful  by the results produced  so
far.
I  What  have we learned, what would be helpful
What have  we learned from reams and reams of growth  regressions  in which  literally
hundreds  of variables  have been  place on the right hand side with growth  rates on the left?  A
critical and skeptical  reading  of the Levine-Renelt  (1992)  paper on the robustness  of the various
partial correlation  findings  would  suggest  that these have  taught  us little or nothing' 8. However,
7  There  are large unanswered  questions  about how in practice  terms of trade are represented  in existing
national  accounts.
18  The recent  approach  of Sala-I-Martin  (1997) which  criticizes  the Levine-Renelt  (1992) approach  for being
too stringent  and calculating  the fraction  of regressions  from which  a variable is not significant  think does not
adequately  address  the multi-collinearity  point. Suppose  there are two equally  important  but unrelated  syndromes
which  prevent growth. Suppose,  for whatever  reasons  one of them has nine easily measured,  but highly
correlated,  symptoms  which  will drive each other to individual  insignificance  while the other syndrome  has only
one measured  symptom Then in ten regressions  the syndrome  with one symptom  will appear in all ten regressions
and appear  a "robust"  growth correlate  while each of the other syndromes  symptoms  will be "non-robust"
32I take a much more positive tack and suggest that we have learned there are three growth
diseases, or perhaps better said, anti-growth syndromes, to avoid. Syndromes have many
associated symptoms that together help identify the problem, but the symptom is not the
problem.
Most of the partial correlates that are included in growth regressions that are significant are
so because they are symptomatic of the manifestation of one of these three syndromes in table 9.
Each of the variables listed has been used in one or another in a growth regression.
appearing  individually  significant  only  when  included  with  syndromes  A's symptom.  There  is no mechanical  or
algorithmic  solution  to this  problem.
33Table 9:  Anti-growth syndromes and their symptomatic manifestations in regression rhs
variables
Syndrome  Associated observable symptoms
Chronic or severe episodes of macroeconomic  inflation, high fiscal deficits, black market
imbalance or instability  premium, variance of inflation (or premia),
foreign exchange or NTB controls, exchange
rate over-valuation or variance, excessively
negative real interest rates, financial market
development indicators
Excessive inward orientation  trade barrier measures of various kinds,
exchange rate overvaluation, foreign
exchange controls, growth in volume or
composition of exports, capital market
controls, foreign direct investment, little
movement or intellectual interchange, indices
of "economic freedom", black market premia,
"outward orientation" measures based on
PPP.
State led development with a non-  corruption, quality of bureaucracy, negative
developmental state  (or zero) effects of government spending,
political instability or "bad government"
indicators, rule of law, low levels of health or
education conditional on income, excessive
income inequality, imposed socialist states,
urban bias, excessive taxation of agriculture.
First, since many of the symptoms are overlapping within and across syndromes (many
socialist economies were inward oriented, many non-developmental states had maccro crises) the
lack of the data to separately identify the individual contribution of each symptom (which is
really the heart Levine-Renelt critique) is not that surprising (even if it is an important advance in
understanding these regressions).  If I know that high inflation and growth are negatively
correlated then I also know that money supply growth and variance of prices and variance of
34inflation  are likely to be negatively  correlated  with growth  too and I learn the same  thing from all
of them.
Second,  the few really  rapidly  growing  countries  have avoided  nearly  all of these syndromes
simultaneously  and consistently,  which again makes  partialling  things  out quite difficult. The
continued  debate  about trade policy  in the East Asian miracle  countries,  where  the question  of
just how "activist"  and "interventionist"  trade and industrial  policy can be without  being "inward
oriented"  reveals  how difficult  resolving  these issues really  is (Rodrik, 1997). Conversely,  if one
constructs  a single  binary variable  encompassing  many of these syndromes  as Sachs and Warner
(1  996) have done,  obviously  it will work like gangbusters  in a regression. This might suggest
some  kind of interactive  effects  where  the absence  of all syndromes  can lead to much more rapid
growth  than if any one is present. An interesting  recent paper by Ghosh and Wolf (1998)  uses
a flexible  approach  to the data, classification  tree analysis, the categorize  growth experiences
without imposing  the restrictions  of multivariate  regressions.
Episodes. Growth regressions  as a tool are completely  spent  and moving to "panels" is
unlikely  to be of much use, and averaging over the whole period will miss many important
phenomena  entirely. For instance, Senegal's  growth was .18 ppa while Cote d' Ivoire's was
.22 ppa.  However, Senegal  had essentially  this same growth rate the entire period, while CIV
grew at 3.11 ppa up to 1980 and GDPPC  fell at 4.11 after 1980. Certainly  these are very
different experiences  and the one summary  number fails to capture this.  But dividing the
entire period up into arbitrary 4 or 5 or 7 or 10 year bits and saying CIV had some  positive
and some  negative and relating  that to a predetermined  set of X variables also does not seem
promising.
35There are three promising approaches  to yield insights  into growth.
First, the analysis  of episodes  of the initiation  of growth acceleration  of deceleration' 9. For
each of the "plateau" "mountain" and "cliff' countries  there is usually a quite easily
identifiable  downward  turning point after which growth was much more rapid than before.
Moreover, for many of the "steep hill" countries  there is an identifiable  "take-off" date after
which growth was much more rapid.  One strategy of research that seems  promising is to
examine  the break points.  Why did growth turn down or up so sharply around a certain date?
Studies  of this type of the  growth take off in Korea in the early 1960s  (Haggard  et al, 1990)
or in Mauritius 1970 (Romer, ), or even Indonesia  in 1966 or China since 1978 are extremely
useful.  Similarly,  why did some countries  hit periods of slow or negative growth and were
unable to reverse the decline?
These studies can identify  what the shifts were that accompanied  the growch  accelerations
or decelerations. Not only that, they also could identify  what the political  conditions  were that
would make the adoption  of such reforms possible  or made adopting  policies  that would avoid
a growth decline impossible  (Rodrik, 1996).
The second type of useful study is analysis  of the episodes  of the evolution  of possible
growth determinants. For instance, in Bruno  and Easterly's (1998)  analysis of the growth
impact  of inflations  shows that the impacts  of inflation  on growth are impossible  to estimate
from either long-period  averages  or from panels, but when one analyzes  episodes  of inflation
19 There is a rich economic  literature  in a number  of fields  relying on episodic  analysis,
both statistical  and case study based. The studies  on the effects  of devaluation  by Kamin  (1988)
and Edwards  (1993)  rely on identifiction  of discrete  devaluation  episodes,  the impact  of debt
crisis (), banking  crises,  and currency  crises all rely on episodic analysis.
36one finds clear and robust, if surprising, findings. Similarly,  while now "ancient" by current
standards  the NBER study of exchange  rate regimes and import liberalization  episodes  in ten
countries  by Bhagwati  and Krueger has more insights  and persuasive  power than all growth
regressions  with "openness" as a rhs variable ever done.
The third high potential is some analysis  of changes  in growth rates over time.  This is
partly high potential  because  unexplored. In fact, when I wrote the first draft of this paper I
could claim there had been no studies looking  systematically  at the determinants  of changes  in
growth rates.  However, Dani Rodrik's (1997)  new paper in which he does investigate  how the
change in growth between the early and later periods of the data.  He shows  that growth
deceleration  is determined  by a combination  of the shocks  to the economy  and their ability to
adjust to those shocks, which was determined  by social and political factors. I think his paper
already shows the promise of the approach  of investigating  shifts in growth rates as well as
levels.
Conclusion
There is something  of a professional  split by field in the "growth" literature. Economists
who approach  growth from having been developed  country  macro economists  and move from
"cycles" to "growth" tend to focus on the OECD countries. This leads them quite naturally  to
the happy puzzle of why growth has chugged along at around 2 percent per annum  for a
hundred  years or more, with some mild interest in why some  have had steeper  hills than
others, and ponder whether all in the "convergence  club" will reach the same happy level in
37the end.  However, as growth theorists have always recognized  this set of questions  and
methods about steady state growth are only of mild interest to non-OECD  countries 20.
In contrast, development  economists  are the pathologists  of economics. They deal with a
much broader range of unhappy  experiences.  The growth experiences  of LDCs are
emphatically  not all alike, and not just in how rapid (or slow) their average  growth has been.
The LDCs have found ways to be ecstatic, but have also discovered  a broad range of ways to
be unhappy.
20  Hicks' Capital and Growth casually claims it is obvious that growth theory is the least relevant of all
the fields of economics to the developing nations.
38References
Alesina, Alberto  and Roberto Perotti, 1993, "Income  distribution,  political instability,  and
investment,"  NBER  Working Paper Series  No. 4486.
Andrews, Donald W. K.,  1989, "Power in econometric  applications,"  Econometrica 57:1059-90.
Barro, Robert  J. And Xavier  Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Economic Growth,  New York: McGraw Hill.
Ben-David,  Dan and David Papell, 1997, "Slowdowns  and meltdowns:  post-war  growth evidence
from 74 countries," NBER Working  Paper Series No. 6266 (November).
Bruno, Michael  and William Easterly, 1998, "Inflation  crises and long-run growth," Journal  of
Monetary  Economics  v 41:pp2-26.
Deininger, Klaus and Lyn Squire, 1996, "A new data set measuring income  inequality," World
Bank Economic  Review, 10:565-91  (September).
Edwards, Sebastian, 1989, Real exchange  rates, devaluation  and adjustment  : exchange  rate
policy in developing  countries,  Cambridge,  Mass. : MIT Press.
Forbes, Kristin, 1991, "A reassessment  of the relationship  between inequality  and growth,"
mimeo, MIT Department  of Economics  (November).
Gallup, John Luke and Jeffrey Sachs, 1998, "Geography  and Economic  Growth," Annual Bank
Conference  on Development  Economics, 1998.
Ghosh, Atish and Holger Wolf, 1998, "Thresholds and Context Dependence  in Growth," mimeo.
Haggard, Stephan,  Kim, Byung-Kook,  and Chung-in Moon, 1990, "The Transition  to export- led
growth in South Korea, 1954-66," World  Bank PRE Working  Papers, WPS 546.
Islam, Nazrul, 1995, "Growth  empirics: a panel data approach," Quarterly  Journal of Economics,
110:1127-70  (November).
Kamin, Steven, 1988, "Devaluation,  external balance, and macroeconomic  performance:  a
look at the numbers," Princeton:  Princeton University  International  Finance Section.
Kelley, Allen C. and Robert Schmidt, 1994, "Population  and income change : recent evidence,"
World  Bank discussion  papers No. 249.
Knack, Stephen  and Philip Keefer, 1997, "Does social capital have an economic  payoff?  A
cross-country  investigation,"  Quarterly  Journal of Economics, 112:1251-88  (November).
39Levine,  Ross, 1997, "Financial  development  and economic  growth: views and agenda," Journal
of Economic  Literature, 35:688-726  (June).
Levine, Ross and David Renelt, 1992, "Sensitivity  analysis  of cross- country growth regressions,"
American  Economic  Review, 82:942-63  (September).
Lucas, Robert E., Jr.,  1988, "On the mechanics  of economic  development:  W. A. Mackintosh
Lecture 1985," Journal  of Monetary  Economics, 22:3-42 (July).
Maddison, Angus, 1995, Monitoring  the world economy,  1820-1992,  Paris : Development  Centre
of the Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and Development.
Persson, Torsten and Guido  Tabellini, 1994, "Is inequality  harmful for growth?" American
Economic  Review, 84:600-21  (June).
Pritchett, Lant, 1996, "Mind your p's and q's : the cost of public investment  is not the value
of public capital," World  Bank Policy Research  Working  Paper, No. 1660.
Pritchett, Lant, 1996, "Where has all the education  gone?"  World  Bank Policy Research Working
Paper, No. 1581.
Rodrik, Dani, 1997, "Where did all the growth go: External Schocks,  Social Conflict  and Growth
Collapses," mimeo (November).
Rodrik, Dani, 1996, "Uderstanding  economic  policy reform," Journal of Economic  Literature,
34:9-41  (March).
Rodrik, Dani, 1997, "Getting interventions  right: how South Korea and Taiwan grew rich,"
Economic  Policy, No. 20:55-107  (April).
Romer, Paul, 1993, "Two strategies  for economic  development  : using ideas vs. producing
ideas," Annual  Bank Conference  on Development  Economics, 1992.
Danny T., 1996, "Twin peaks: growth and convergence  in models  of distribution  dynamics,"
Economic  Journal, 106:1045-55  (July).
Sala-i-Martin,  Xavier, 1997, "I just ran two million  regressions," American  Economic  Review,
Papers and Proceedings,  87(2):  178-83  (May).
Sachs,  Jeffrey and Andrew Warner, 1995, "Economic  convergence  and economic  policies,"
National  Bureau of Economic  Research  Working Paper No. 5039.
40NOITESPolicy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1925  Half a Century of Development  Jean Waelbroeck  May 1998  J. Sweeney
Economics: A Review Based on  31021
the Handbook  of Development
Economics
WPS1926  Do Budgets Really Matter?  Emmanuel Ablo  June 1998  K. Rivera
Evidence from Public Spending  Ritva Reinikka  34141
on Education and Health in Uganda
WPS1927  Revenue-productive Income Tax  Fareed M. A. Hassan  June 1998  A. Panton
Structures and Tax Reforms in  85433
Emerging  Market Economies:
Evidence from Bulgaria
WPS1928  Combining Census and Survey Data  Jesko Hentschel  June  1998  P. Lanjouw
to Study Spatial Dimensions  Jean Olson Lanjouw  34529
of Poverty  Peter Lanjouw
Javier Poggi
WPS1929  A Database of World  Infrastructure  David Canning  June 1998  A. Abuzid
Stocks,  1950-95  33348
WPS1930  The Main Determinants  of Inflation in  ilker  Domac  June 1998  F.  Lewis
Albania  Carlos Elbrit  82979
WPS1931  The Cost and Performance of Paid  Ariel Dinar  June 1998  F. Toppin
Agricultural  Extenion Services: The  Gabriel Keynan  30450
Case of Agricultural  Technology
Transfer in Nicaragua
WPS1932  Air Pollution and Health Effects:  Bart D. Ostro  June 1998  C Bernardo
A Study of Respiratory Illness  Gunnar S. Eskeland  31148
Among  Children in Santiago, Chile  Tarhan Feyzioglu
Jose Miguel Sanchez
WPS1933  The 1997 Pension Reform in Mexico  Gloria Grandolini  June 1998  C. Zappala
Luis Cerda  87945
WPS1934  WTO Accession for Countries  Constantine Michalopoulos  June 1998  L. Tabada
in Transition  36896
WPS1 935  Explaining the Increase in Inequality  Branko Milanovic  June  1998  G. Evans
during the Transition  85734
WPS1936  Determinants of Transient and  Jyotsna Jalan  June 1998  P. Sader
Chronic Poverty: Evidence from  Martin Ravallion  33902
Rural China
WPS1937  Aid, the Incentive Regime, and  Craig Burnside  June 1998  E. Khine
Poverty Reduction  David Dollar  37471Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1938  What Explains  the Success  David  Dollar  June 1998  E. Khine
or Failure  of Structural  Adjustment  Jakob  Svensson  37471
Programs?
WPS1939 Second  Thoughts  on Second  Arturo  J. Galindo  June 1998  M. Cervantes
Moments:  Panel  Evidence  on  William F. Maloney  37794
Asset-Based  Models  of Currency
Crises
WPS1  940 The Structure  of Labor Markets  in  William F. Maloney  June 1998  M. Cervantes
Developing  Countries:  Time  Series  37794
Evidence  on Competing  Views
WPS1941  Are Labor  Markets  in Developing  William F. Maloney  June 1998  M. Cervantes
Countries  Dualistic?  37794
WPS1942 Poverty  Correlates  and Indicator-  Christiaan  Grootaert  July 1998  G. Ochieng
Based  Targeting  in Eastern  Europe  Jeanine  Braithwaite  31123
and the Former  Soviet  Union
WPS1943 The Implications  of Hyperbolic  Maureen  Cropper  July 1998  A. Maranon
Discounting  for Project  Evaluation  David  Laibson  39074
WPS1944 Detecting  Price  Links in the World  John Baffes  July 1998  J. Baffes
Cotton  Market  81880
WPS1945 Evaluating  a Targeted  Social  Martin  Ravallion  July 1998  P. Sader
Program  When Placement  Is  Quentin  Wodon  33902
Decentralized
WPS1946 Estonia:  The  Challenge  of Financial  Carlos  Cavalcanti  July 1998  L. Osborne
Integration  Daniel  Oks  38482